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Abstract: Perception shifts the surroundings of organism with nervous systems deeply inside the brain, creating an 
experiential environment from the signatures of physical surroundings. Setting out from these primitives for subjective 
experience cognitive abilities emerge that deliver a physical description of the self/world boundary as an end-product and 
allow us to develop a functional relationship with our environment. This view does not give physicality but subjective 
experience a primacy for the description of our world. However, by a kind of cognitive recursion we can try to physically 
describe the tight relation between the architecture of the experiencing agent with the phenomenon of conscious 
experience. In this article I present a sequence of testable relationships between brain dynamics at different scales and 
conscious perception. I argue that the most convincing physical connection between the information based structure of 
the brain and the primitives of experience resides in specific electron de-localizations at the quantum scale within ion 
conducting membrane proteins of electrically excitable cell membranes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In its canonical version, i.e. according to standard 
physical rules, neuroscience deals with the matching of 
the brains signalling structure to the variation of 
physical properties of the world around us. This relation 
builds on statistical principles behind information 
contents and transmission and it is solely embedded on 
physical grounds and physically derived neural 
strategies (see for example W. Bialek’s detailed tutorial 
outline in [1]). Along this view the intention is to study 
relations between matter- based systems (the brains 
molecules and their interactions) and matter-based 
environments (the physical signals of our 
surroundings). Due to enormous technological 
advances studies of this ‘type I relation’, as I would like 
to call it, have made an immense progress reaching 
into the technical emulation of brain processes, AI and 
brain-machine interfaces [2]. There is, however, a 
second type of relation, a much more radical one, with 
an ancient history and a basically unresolved duality: 
The relation of the matter-based system composing a 
brain with the phenomenon of subjectivity, the 
‘experience of awareness’, a highly non-physical, but 
naturally occurring and hardly deniable property of the 
agent hosting this brain. This ‘type II relation’ between 
physics and the (natural) occurrence of a mental state, 
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reflects a connection between a state of matter in our 
brain and how it ‘feels’ for an observing agent to have 
this state of matter in his/her brain, a highly intriguing 
situation reaching far beyond traditional physicalism. I 
have discussed a possible and testable causal 
structure of type I and type II relations recently in [3]. 
Despite the domination of traditional neuralism focusing 
on the interaction of matter, the study of type II 
relations has received an increasing attention from the 
various disciplines of neuroscience more recently e.g. 
[4, 5], and this has led to an impressive list of 
publications within the studies of consciousness and 
cognition (e.g. the Tucson series on Consciousness 
studies). 
The brain enables and controls perceptive 
processes. There is a helpful taxonomy behind the 
variation of these perceptive abilities that ranges from 
the unconscious and subliminal to preconscious and 
fully conscious perceptions [6]. And these distinctions 
map well into relations between systems and 
environments as suggested here. I think that some of 
the enduring conflicts to ‘explain’ subjectivity and 
conscious experience in brain science may be due to 
the fact that no or little distinction between type I and 
type II relations is made. For example, the unconscious 
‘autopilot’ in our brain [7] may eventually become 
completely explained within concepts merely based on 
type I relations. In terms of explanations type I relations 
offer an ‘easy problem’ in the sense of Chalmers [8]. 
Within type II relations however, the perceived quality 
of an environment becomes inseparable from the 
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perceiving subject (the system). From a modelling 
perspective, this situation leads to a much more 
complex system partition, more similar to a ‘Von 
Neumann tripartite system’ interpretation in quantum 
mechanics (QM) [9]. In Von Neumann’s view one of the 
partners in a QM system interaction is the human 
observer. There are very good reasons why the 
pioneers of quantum physical conceptions and 
ontologies such as Von Neumann [9], Schrödinger [10], 
Wigner [11], Everett [12], Bohm [13] and others were 
stretching their view far beyond reductive materialistic 
positions, involving type II relations in the problem of 
measurement and observations. Today there is a 
theoretical development that tries to revitalize and unify 
these ideas within a ‘quantum-like’ interpretation of 
cognition and perception [14-16].  
Environments interacting with neural systems are at 
the centre of attention in Neuroecology. In the present 
assay I investigate the question of environment-system 
interactions in the view of the above defined relations I 
and II. System partitions that may help to form a basis 
for a viable theory of adaptive behaviours and involve 
cognition and (conscious) perception of an experien- 
cing agent will be proposed. Such an ambitious 
intention naturally entails problems. Conceptions, 
methods and evidence for these considerations have 
arisen from fields as diverse as neuro-philosophy and 
biology, ecology and behavioural sciences, compara- 
tive cognition, physics, theoretical and quantum 
mechanics, coding and information theory. This makes 
their combined demonstration difficult, if not impossible. 
The suggested evidence quite often only applies to a 
particular discipline and appears to be unrelated in the 
view of a unified approach. In addition, plausible 
explanations of how experience relates to environ- 
ments may finally require an exhaustive description at 
the atomic and molecular level of both, the system and 
its environment, a task that simply cannot be done. The 
good news is however, that the derived dynamical 
principles seem to apply across many scales, ranging 
from the microscopic to the macroscopic domain. The 
claim is that the dynamics behind relations I and II has 
some scale invariant property that allows us to 
reconcile dimensional differences to a great extent.  
Here I will first set out to define and explain some 
formal background and introduce the way we can 
present the relational structure between dynamic 
variables in brain science and relate their ’meaning’ to 
an environmental context. In what follows I develop a 
basic conjecture for the brain-environment context of 
an observing and experiencing agent. As the signalling 
characteristic (relation I) in nervous systems is given by 
the cooperative dynamics of ion channels, the focus 
will be laid on the emergent properties of molecular 
transitions within channel proteins. There we can 
identify a Prigogine-Nicolis type of dynamic self-
assembly [17] at the atomic scale that offers a 
candidate solution for relation II [3]. In our previous 
work we have provided evidence that transitions at the 
quantum scale within ion channel filter regions may 
have functional significance in shaping and controlling 
the emerging macroscopic transmembrane signals of 
excitable membranes [18-20]. Here I extend this view 
involving the electronic surroundings of conducting ions 
within membrane proteins and finally propose the 
underlying electronic conformational change as a core 
transition in the sense of relation II. Finally I summarize 
evidence and testability for this conjecture. 
ENVIRONMENT -SYSTEM PARTITIONS: GENERAL 
ASPECTS 
System partitions, such as the traditional distinction 
between an environment and a brain (a surrounding 
and a system) follow from the Cartesian view of local 
physical properties. There objects can be delineated, 
defined, are separate and are outside of each other. 
This sets the frame for ordinary physical conceptions 
from classical to quantum physics and it is also largely 
the result of our naïve perception of the world ‘around 
us’. In this paper I will however dissolve the system 
view gradually, inspired by the Bohmian interpretation 
of quantum- physics [13], ‘biogenic’ information 
concepts [21], holonomic brain science [22] and 
complex dynamics [17]. I intend to translate this all into 
a somehow new view in Neuroecology, where system 
partitions separating the organism from its environment 
are less important. Transition dynamics, changes, 
interactions between systems play the essential role 
and give rise to experiential properties. Properties are 
not static attributes of systems but are permanently 
gained, lost and regained.  
Initially we review the canonical systems view: 
Figure 1 demonstrates two different system partitions 
as seen from a conventional perspective. The arrows in 
the figure represent an exchange of information 
between systems. We use the arrows for very general, 
uni- or bi-directional interaction terms that symbolize 
causal relations among system partitions, thereby 
changing the systems physically. If for example a 
system A changes a system B we write {A → B}, with 
vertices denoting the systems and edges the 
transients. Initially this notation is just a mathematical 
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object, but its interpretation leads to a broad range of 
algebraic descriptions in physics, describing 
trajectories of systems in space-time and system 
interactions in quantum-physics. It is expandable to 
structural causal modelling (SCM) as developed by 
Pearl and Scheines [23,24] and described in short 
previously [3]. In this later situation the vertices would 
represent (causally-) related variables rather than 
system partitions.  
 
Figure 1: System partitions and their possible interactions 
between environments (E) and a system (S) under study. In 
(a) a general quantum physical partition is sketched, in (b) a 
partition that is suggested to apply for a resolvable quantum 
to classical transition as well as for a description of brain 
processes of an observing agent is shown (compare with 
figure 2(a)).  
Also apparent from Figure 1 are two different types 
of system partitions. In (a) a partition is shown that is 
broad enough to cover a general physical interaction 
situation that may for example underlay a quantum to 
classical transition. In physics the arrows would 
represent interaction-Hamiltonians between different 
(sub-) systems and the delineation of these systems 
very much depends on the interaction strength with 
their neighbours. As in physics the universe is 
generally considered as a huge collection of open and 
interacting quantum systems the most basic partition 
between systems and environments sets out from the 
quantum scale. Let’s assume the partition shown in 
Figure 1(a) is a separation of idealized quantum-
systems, a system and its interacting environments that 
can evolve for a certain but short time in isolation prior 
to interactions. Classicality and most, but not all, 
macroscopic partitions in this view appear as emergent 
properties of quantum observables and systems. 
However, the understanding of classical emergence 
seems to be an enduring problem with many aspects 
still unresolved [25]. The reason is that quantum 
systems are assumed to evolve into a (linear) 
combination of arbitrary states (‘coherence’), a 
superposition of possibilities that are never seen to 
coexist in our ‘real world’. If one wants to observe 
(measure) these states we have to allow for an 
interaction of one correlated quantum system (say, S in 
Figure 1) with a measurement environment or 
apparatus (say E1 in Figure 1) that also constitutes a 
quantum system with correlated states. Upon 
interaction the compound system (SE1) bears non-
separable between system correlations, no 
independencies that would allow us to make 
predictions about alternatives upon observing a certain 
outcome of a measurement. This delicate situation was 
first recognized by von Neumann [9].  
 
Figure 2: A system partition demonstrating a ‘von Neumann 
tripartite chain’ of a system (S), an apparatus or 
measurement device (A) and an environment (E). The 
concentric alignment in (a) leads to interactions that are 
modelled in (b) by a ‘causal graph’ of a structural equation 
model (SEM) that describes the relation of cause and effect 
by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs, as described in the main 
text, [23, 24]). The emerging von Neumann chain from the 
composed system SA is SAE. Correlations (C) are indicated 
by dashed arrows and causal relations by solid arrows 
between vertices denoting the systems. The meaning of the 
causal graph shown in (b) is discussed in the main text.  
Von Neumann’s major contribution to resolve the 
problem behind a quantum-classical transition was to 
show how the quantum correlations of composite 
states (e.g. a system and a measurement device, SA in 
Figure 2(b)) can be transformed into a set of 
measureable numbers with only classical correlations 
(the SAE chain in Figure 2). A deeper discussion of this 
process is offered by Zurek [25] and a demonstrative 
calculation employing density-matrix transformations by 
Tegmark [26]. In von Neumann’s view this reduction of 
a highly correlated state into a ‘reduced density matrix’ 
with only classical probabilities is due to a mental 
process performed by the brain of an observing agent. 
This view opposes the orthodox physicalists 
interpretation that suggests that a reduction of a 
quantum state (e.g. by von Neumann’s ‘process 1’) is 
independent of any observing agent, but emerges 
through the ‘selective dynamics’ of the engaged 
system-environment partitions and the brain works 
solely on classical principles as Zurek and Tegmark 
suggest. However, I think that physicalism and 
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classical neuralisms are a prejudice of our time as K. 
Gödel has correctly put it [27] and are now increasingly 
disapproved by the development of cognitive biology. 
In line with a long list of high calibre contributions 
ranging from philosophy to physics such as those from 
Whitehead, von Neumann, Bohm, Wigner, Stapp and 
Penrose and many others I advocate the view that 
‘experience’ must be at the centre of our attention. 
Experience is real and has a primacy for the 
description of our world and the relation of our brain 
processes to the perceived qualities around us. The 
physical aspects of experience (i.e. the results of our 
experience based mental efforts to describe nature) 
involve a quantum to classical transition and this 
occurs in the organization of an observing and 
experiencing subject. In what follows I will try to 
substantiate this view by reinterpreting the signalling 
and information based structure of our brain within the 
concept of ‘meaning’ and conscious experience.  
NEURAL ENVIRONMENTS AT DIFFERENT SCALES 
Type I Relations: Structure 
Perception shifts environments deeply inside the 
brain. Remarkably this situation also impressed one of 
the founders of quantum-physics, Erwin Schrödinger 
[10] and I will come back to this view for a deeper 
reason. From the outlines shown in Figure 1b a 
concentric organization of environments and systems is 
apparent that symbolizes some important aspects 
behind the functional wiring pattern of nerve cells (the 
‘effective connectome’) in the brain. If we consider a 
single cell activity as the system variable ( ‘S’ in Figure 
1b), the graph implies that this property results from a 
mapping of membrane currents (J) from different 
environment Ei over a ‘time-history’ t < t0 into the 
presence of absence of a spike at time t0 , i.e. J(t< t0) 
→S(t0). This is the classical neural coding principle in 
the view of ‘type I relations’ as defined above, shaped 
into a simple and straight forward relation. It also 
implies that neural systems are ‘embedded’ into a 
certain (neural-) environment that determines their 
activity and ‘embeddedness’ is the decisive 
determinant [28]. The environment for brain cells is 
made of other brain cells and downstream and 
upstream information exchange between these cells 
are hierarchically organized, largely separating late 
stage cells along increasing synaptic distances from 
the transducing sensory ‘surrounding’ of an organism.  
The question arises whether neural systems and 
environments are characterized by a specific topology 
along metrically scaled organizations and to what 
extent this organization determines the dynamics and 
the emerging functional character such as cognition 
and behaviour. Recent progress in neural network 
simulations [28, 29], together with advances in 
combined morphological and electro-physiological 
profiling [30, 31] has substantially improved our 
understanding in this direction. One of the major 
conclusions drawn from these studies is that we have 
to go far beyond statistical correlations in order to 
understand the structure-function relations in the brain. 
In Karl Friston’s view the major challenge is to explain 
why one fixed structural organization (‘structural and 
effective embeddedness’) can give rise to a huge 
manifold of functional diversity. Knowing that 
‘embeddedness’ of a neuron within its environment is a 
key determinant of its function this question becomes 
even more pressing.  
There is a certain topology behind the wiring pattern 
among nerve cells. However, we do not understand the 
‘meaning’ of this connectivity. From a number of recent 
comparative studies among vertebrates one finds 
striking parallels among mammalian and avian 
forebrains in specific volumes and connectivity 
patterns. Despite a long lasting evolutionary 
divergence, these convergent structures seem to 
correlate with specific cognitive, social and migratory 
behaviours across very diverse animal species and 
brain architectures [see for example 32, 33, 34]. What 
we can learn from the results of these studies might 
offer an important indication for the connection of type I 
and type II relations as defined above, for a connection 
between the signalling structure of the brain and the 
‘meaning’ of these signals from the view of 
phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity. First, 
higher cognitive functions and emotions seem to be 
based on a single und unique principle behind the 
wiring pattern of brain cells [32, 35]. Further, results 
from correlations of brain size with cognitive abilities 
[36,37,38] show that these functions are accompanied 
by an increasing recruitment of nerve cells into 
functional ‘modules’. The addition of more nerve cells 
increasing the relative brain volume is associated with 
an increase in functional ‘modularity’, the cortical 
sensory segregation volume [39, 40].  
Bridging to Type II Relations: Dynamics Along 
Multiscale Organizations 
First we have to ask the question how the neural 
connectome produces this enormous range of 
phenomenal experience behind cognitive, emotional 
and volitional functions? This question is reminiscent of 
Karl Friston’s ‘one to many problem’ in brain science 
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[29]. Intuitively, a given pattern can only give rise to this 
large variety of functions through its dynamical 
properties and these properties manifest themselves at 
different scales of spatial and temporal resolutions. See 
Figure 3 for a demonstrative (metaphoric) example 
from the interaction of waves. 
 
Figure 3: A single-point perturbation produces the spread of 
a spherical wave on the surface of a medium (e.g. water, top 
left). If two point sources interact (top right) we observe a 
pattern of phase-differences, an interference pattern 
spreading out in space-time (bottom left). Changes in just two 
properties of this perturbation, wave-length and interaction-
distance are sufficient to produce a large variety of different 
interferences (bottom right). This is a demonstration of a ‘one 
to many’ relation between structure and function, how 
dynamics created from two point sources can give rise to a 
large collection of space-time effects.  
If dynamics is the key to understand brain function, 
we have to look into the organization and critical 
features behind these processes in the brain. Dyna- 
mics is defined by a change of states of some physical 
entity within space and time. It leads to more or less 
stable transients, ranging from rather permanent 
(equilibrated) states as found in non-living matters, to 
only transiently stable states that are more typical for 
living systems. However, in the present context I want 
to add a different and frequently overseen aspect on 
dynamics that involves a system-environment partition 
as discussed in the section above.  
There are at least two main signatures that 
determine the realization of a dynamical change: First, 
local interactions between the smallest constituents of 
the changing system and second, energy gradients that 
constrain these changes. The cooperation of these two 
aspects cause transient assemblies (‘self-assemblies’) 
of their constituents that are typical for biological 
structures at various scales ranging from atomic 
configurations in molecules to cells and tissues (see 
Prigogine’s seminal work on complexity [41]). Biological 
dynamics is dissipative at functional scales and 
requires the permanent supply of energy leading to 
‘dynamic self-assembly’ as for example demonstrated 
by artificial systems more recently [42]. A system-
environment partition would set out from the ‘seeds’ , 
the smallest constituents, the atoms and molecules, 
that give rise to an emergent configuration, in the same 
way as the interaction of water molecules gives rise to 
propagating waves by the transfer of energies that 
entertain these interactions. Assemblies emerging from 
this dynamics therefore cross multiple physical scales 
and action orders. 
For the transition from quantum to classical 
descriptions W. Zurek has defined an ‘action-distance’, 
as the physical action necessary to distinguish between 
the possible states of an environment (E in Figure 2) 
that correspond to different states of a system (S in 
Figure 2) [43]. This can give us a first impression about 
the scaling differences along which system-
environment assemblies are realized. I have given 
some numbers for the estimation of these action orders 
ranging from the molecular to the cellular level before 
[44].  
 
Figure 4: Action distance characterizes neural environments 
and systems at different scales. Molecules such as channel 
proteins provide environments for atoms (e.g. alkali ions), 
cells provide the same for molecules and the brains 
connectome for single cells. Finally the environment for a 
brain are other brains at the end of the scale. Interestingly 
there is a linear scaling difference roughly at the order of 10 
magnitudes in Lagrangian (L) units. 
In Figure 4 the action distances are sketched along 
different constituents of systems ranging from atoms to 
social brains. Here these distances ∆ are estimated by  
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where the εI denote two possible states of the 
environment, corresponding to two opposite states of 
the system ↑↓, N the number of modes (particles) in 
the environment and ℏ the reduced Planck’s constant. 
The scales imply that brain dynamics is characterized 
by a ‘spread’ of changes setting out from the smallest 
constituents of a system at the atomic scale up to 
environments provided by entire and social brains. A 
highly interesting observation behind the ‘environmen- 
tal scales’ as shown in Figure 4 is, that the physical 
actions that characterize systems from atoms to brains 
spread out into environments that are very regularly 10 
orders of magnitudes larger as estimated by action 
distances with the above relation. Thus, the brains 
organization offers a highly ordered and unique path 
along which dynamics changes from completely 
dissipative to metastable states of systems. Or, put in 
other words, the microscopic level with its atomic and 
molecular dynamics combines to determine the 
dynamics at the cellular and organ level in a highly 
ordered and predictable way. With electrically excitable 
cells, the ion channel proteins that cooperate in the 
transmission of electrical membrane signals along cells 
are naturally at the centre of this organization. Within 
these molecules we must expect the ‘seeds’ for the 
overall multiscale dynamics of the brain. In the 
following I will examine what dynamical characteristic 
we can expect at the molecular and single atom level 
and how these changes could build up a bridge 
between type I and type II relations in the sense 
mentioned above. 
TYPE II Relations: The Atomic Scale  
Ion channel proteins regulate the concerted 
translocation of charges bound to ions across the cells 
plasma membrane. A very long sequence of atomic 
resolution studies has revealed the underlying 
mechanisms in great details and deepened the 
understanding of impulse propagation in nerve cells 
[45]. The main focus of these studies has been laid on 
the channels ability for very fast conduction near the 
diffusion limit without compromising selectivity for a 
given ion species. These are important aspects to 
understand signalling in nerve cells. However, in the 
view of type II relations there is more behind electrical 
membrane signals. What has been largely ignored is 
the functional significance of the changes in the atomic 
conformation that the ions induce within the protein 
themselves during the non-conductive stages. The 
electronic lining of ions from carbonyl oxygen in the 
filter region (sketched in Figures 5a and 5b) has been 
recognized to serve the coordination of ions by 
mimicking the electrostatic interactions otherwise 
provided by the hydration shell of ions in watery 
environments. An important observation regarding the 
dynamics of ions in conducting proteins is that during 
the non-conductive and low-concentration states of the 
filter, ions move many times between potential minima, 
e.g. the so-called 1,3 and 2,4 configuration [46, 47]. 
During these trans-locations the metal ion in the filter 
induces a substantial electron delocalization of its 
environment and this effect correlates with the 
Coulomb interaction distance between the ion and the 
surrounding oxygen atoms (Figure 5c), as apparent 
from density functional studies [48].  
It is well established that proteins in general, and, in 
particular, α-helical conformations are particularly 
susceptible to these induced electron delocalizations, 
leading to partial covalency in the otherwise non-
covalent interaction of atoms [49]. Now, an important 
observation for the present view is the finding of 
Bartlett et al. about the delocalization of a Ione pair of 
electrons (n) from oxygen atoms to the antibonding 
orbital (π∗) of neighbouring carbonyls (see Figure 5c) 
[50]. The computational and structural studies of the 
Bartlett group identified a widespread occurence of 
n→π∗ interactions in three quadrants of the 
Ramachandran plot with their typical signatures: 
pyramidalization of the acceptor carbonyls and 
polarization of their π-electrons. These are quantum-
mechanical effects within the protein, with energy 
resources from the dissipation of ion motion in the filter 
region. This induces specific electronic de-localizations 
in the α-helical lining of channel proteins. Moreover, 
the same group found ample evidence for a tight 
correlation of filter conduction states with n→π∗ 
transitions along the chain oxygens. In the closed, non-
conductive and low concentration state of the filter  
(2 ions) the oxygen Ion pairs can participate in n→π∗ 
transitions, whereas in the conductive (high 
concentration, 4 ions) state these electrons coordinate 
the translocation of ions through the filter and do not 
engage in n→π∗ transitions.  
The above findings show us a route how to combine 
type I and II relations in the present context. The 
canonical signature of ‘signalling’, the exchange of 
information among nerve cells is realized by selective 
ion-conduction across membranes that shape 
propagating (action-) potentials. This is one side of the 
story. The other side is, that this process leaves behind 
traces, as it induces electronic de-localizations in parts 
of the channel proteins. Put into the language of 
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environment-system interactions and coming back to 
the ‘von Neumann tripartite chain’ as shown in Figure 
2, the ions would represent the system, the proteins 
represent the ‘apparatus’ and the collection of ion 
channels across cells can be seen as the ‘environment’ 
of this partition. The highly ordered action distance 
(Figure 4) between single channel states and the 
population of channels cooperating for a given signal 
enables quantum-mechanical effects in the electronic 
transitions within the molecular configuration of single 
filter atoms to spread into a classical correlation of 
environmental binary states (open and closed channel 
states).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on a list of empirical evidence I have 
suggested a route how the brain could combine its 
information based signalling activity with ‘imprints’ on 
the electronic configuration inside conducting 
membrane proteins. In the view of biophysical 
modeling, this combination bridges neural field models, 
i.e. the spatial-temporal variation of membrane 
potentials, to ‘neural mass’ activity, a ‘point-like’ 
property characterizing a global brain state at a given 
moment of time as Karl Friston’s group has reviewed 
[51] and I have previously discussed in the present 
context before [3]. Going one step further, it is 
suggested that the field properties reflect the ‘role’ of 
neurons within their effective connectome, their neural 
environment in the brain, or ‘embeddedness’ in the 
view of Vlachos et al. [28]. There is a purpose behind 
this organization that has been largely overseen 
before. The purpose could be to ‘mass-amplify’ the 
configuration of electrons inside the filter-region of 
channels by recruiting more and more channel-filter 
configurations with similar electronic configurations. 
This amplification seems to work by synchronizing the 
conductance of filter states in ion channels because in 
the closed, low ion occupancy state there is a run for 
similar electron de-localizations among carbonyls of the 
filter lining, likely of the n→π∗ type. 
With an average firing rate of neurons in the order 
of 10 Hz and a gating time in the order of 10-3 secs for 
voltage gated ion channels, the channels spend most 
of their time in the closed gating state. During this time 
the filter states can change many times from 
permissive to non-permissive [46,47,48] and ion-
translocations between the ‘oxygen-cages’ of the filter 
will induce electronic reconfigurations of the same type. 
So propagating membrane potentials among 
functionally engaged neurons can be expected to 
synchronize channel, filter and electronic states and 
thereby amplify a specific electronic configuration 
around the atomic skeleton of ion-filter regions. Most 
likely, the closed channel times provide sufficient time 
to synchronize the population of functionally engaged 
cell membranes to adopt this electronic property within 
integrated membrane proteins. 
This view makes changes at the atomic scale in 
special sub-domains of membrane proteins decisive 
and these changes are basically of quantum-physical 
 
Figure 5: Channel states (A), filter states (B) and electronic transitions(C) during ion conduction in voltage gated membrane 
channel proteins. In (D) the time scales and events that characterize the associated channel dynamics are shown. DDSA 
denotes a dynamic dissipative self-assembly of electronic configurations. This dynamics involves a n→π∗ electronic transition of 
carbonyl-oxygen electrons depending on the Coulomb interaction distance to moving alkali-ions during the closed, non-
conductive and low occupancy filter state of the channel as described in the text (C).  
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nature [20, 50, 52, 53]. The entire process outlined 
above is highly reminiscent to a quantum-classical 
transition involving three interacting parties in the 
sense of von Neumann’s and Zurek’s tri-partite 
conjecture [9, 25]. Along these arguments, the systems 
are provided by the moving charges bound to ions, the 
proteins act as the ‘measurement apparatus’ and the 
environment is represented by all channel proteins that 
are associated by the specific wiring pattern of 
functional ‘embeddedness’. In addition, this electronic 
integration may also go beyond ion conduction and 
involve, membrane fatty acids, lipid rafts, G proteins 
and the cytoskeleton as suggested recently by Cocchi 
et al. [55].  
However, ‘type II relations’ as defined in the 
introduction are even more challenging. These 
relations should causally combine physics with a 
mental state, a connection between a state of matter 
(e.g. electrons) and how it feels to ‘be in’ this state of 
matter. The underlying object/subject dichotomy 
remains a philosophical conundrum that cannot be 
resolved by purely associational (statistical) arguments 
within physics. It requires a premise that grants 
experiential properties to physical phenomena, a kind 
of property emergence as claimed by micro-psychistic 
arguments [54]. While the author of this article can 
share such a premise, it is left over to the reader to 
adopt or deny this position. In any case this work 
describes a chain of physical events from the quantum 
to the classical level in the brain that builds on recent 
experimental observations and naturally combines 
what needs to be combined: The relation between the 
information based and spatially segregated neural 
signalling structure on one hand and the convergence 
of these properties to a whole brain state that 
characterizes every moment of experience and may 
provide the ‘meaning’ of this information. This relation 
allows for physical interventions and is testable. For 
example the excellent work of Turin et al. demonstrates 
that the most powerful intervention of conscious 
experience through general anesthesia works through 
electronic perturbations along α- helical peptides [56] 
as suggested here. 
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